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HOk DOES PLATO SOLVE THE PARADOX OF IDQUIRÏ
IK THE HERO?
Michael Morgan, Indiana University
SAGP West, 1985
In this paper I sha 11 focus on a passage in Plato's
dialogue, the heno, that has received wide ana serious attention
of late. It is that stretch of the Heno (80d86c) that incorporates Meno's eristic puzzle, the doctrine of
recollection, Socrates' interrogation of Meno's slave-boy, and
the sequel to that interrogation. I shall try to show that this
text is transitional and doubly so, for, on the one hand, within
the context of the heno it marks the transition between the
earlier elenehoi concerning the nature of arete and the
employment of the method of hypothesis concerning whether arete
is teachable and, on the other, within the early and middle
dialogues as a whole it marks the transition between largely
elenctic, Socratic inquiries and Platonic discussions with
greater epistemological and metaphysical weight. This latter
claim is controversial in a way that the earlier one, about the
text's transitional role in the dialogue, is not, but the claim
is defensible in a way that I shall try to demonstrate in
subsequent sections of this paper.
THE PARADOX Ûi IKt,UIR Y
At Heno 80d a frustrated heno tries to stall his
conversation with Socrates by setting up a roadblock. If you do
not know something, he asks, how can one search for it? lor if
you don't know it, either you can't set it up as the object of
your search or, even if one could, you wouldn't know that what
you found is what you were looking for. Socrates acknowledges
the gambit as a familiar one, though his own reformulation of the
puzzle differs from Reno's version in an important way. To Meno,
the puzzle about inquiry or searching is a dilemma about how,
given an original ignorance, one can either begin or conclude a
search. To Socrates, the puzzle is a dilemma about initiating
such a search; to begin with knowledge of the object sought makes
searching for it unnecessary (and perhaps impossible) and to
begin without knowledge of it makes searching impossible to
iniate. So for Heno the problem concerns the unacceptable
consequences of initial ignorance; for Socrates it concerns, more
radically, the impasse that results from either initial knowing
or initial ignorance. Since it is Socrates' version that is
addressed in the text that follows, we shall concern ourselves
with it alone.
Many commentators, among them Grube, Burnet, Shorey, Ritter,
and Taylor, treat the puzzle lightly as comic relief or a mere
interlude, the dramatic setting into which the doctrine of
recollection is introduced but itself of no serious import. But
other commentators, including Cornford, Bluck, Phillips,
Moravcsik, Irwin, White, and Allen, agree that the puzzle is
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important in itself, although they are not always sensitive to
the differences between Reno's version and Socrates' restatement.
The issue about the puzzle's seriousness is not a minor one.
Socrates recalls the doctrine of recollection because he is
seeking a solution to the current paradox. If the paradox is a
dramatic interlude with no real philosophical role to play, then
one must look elsewhere for the genuine difficulties which the
doctrine of recollection is intended to address. On the other
hand, if the paradox is a serious one and the real reason for
introducing the doctrine of recollection, then what that doctrine
is and how it should be understood will depend upon how it solves
the paradox. And in so far as the doctrine has implications for
Plato's epistemology and the stage it has reached by the time the
heηo was written, the paradox begins tc take on greater
significance still.
It is both plausible that Plato intended the paradox cf
inquiry as a serious puzzle and likely that he did so. lirst,
this would net be the only case where an eristic puzzle played a
serious philosophical role for Plato. While the tuthyderous is a
collection cf sophistical puzzles and paradoxes that are not
typically addressed in that dialogue as serious philosophical
problems, other dialogues show Plate wrestling with sophistical
puzzles with great concern and with impressive results. The
paradoxes about contradiction and relativism in the Cratylus come
to mind, as do the puzzles about aitiai in the Phaedo and the
paradox of phi 1dsophica1 rule in the Repub 1ic. hot all of these,
of course, can be confirmed as conventional eristic tropes, but
some surely can be. Most impressive of all in this genre are the
puzzles about false belief and false speech that generate such
rich results in the Cra ty1us. Thesete tus, and Sophist. This last
case by itself would stand as dramatic evidence that a
commonplace eristic puzzle could take on grand importance for
Plato and stimulate his own philosophical inquiries in very
significant ways.
Secondly, the current puzzle, because cf its specific
content, does have serious implications for Plato and his
Socratic inheritance.
Socrates' reformulation, is an attempt tc
argue that inquiry is impossible. but if that were true, the
result would be some form of skepticism, relativism, or some
whimsical, unsystematic acquisition of moral knowledge. These
would not be welcome alternatives to Socrates or Plato and hence
the challenge of the puzzle would not have teen viewed as a
facile one. lurthermore, in so far as moral knowledge is
necessary for human excellence and thereby for human well-being,
the puzzle is of momentous importance. Tor Socratic dialectic is
both a check on whether one has such moral knowledge and a method
for acquiring it. But, if true, the paradox destroys the
possibility of Socratic inquiry and thereby the possibility of
either confirming one's moral knowledge or acquiring it.
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THE DOCTRINE Of RECOLLECTION AND THE SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX
At 86c Socrates says, "...we are agreed that it is right to
inquire into something that one does not know." This statement
shows that somewhere between 81a and 86c the paradox had been
solved. But what is the solution, and how does it work?
Those who read Guthrie, Cornford, Allen, and Bluck, among
others, will find there what we might call the "traditional
view." According to this view, the paradox is a dilemma about
one's epistemic resources at the outset of inquiry and the role
those resources play at the inquiry's conclusion. The
alternatives that the dilemma proposes are beginning with
(1)total, explicit knowledge or with (2)absolute ignorance. The
doctrine of recollection provides the solution with its proposal
that all inquiry begins with something intermediate between
(1) and (2): latent, unconscious, or implicit knowledge. When
these commentators speak of "total knowledge," they seem to have
in mind "self-consciously clear" or "conscious" knowledge.
They
speak of implicit knowledge being aroused or made explicit —
presumably by a process akin to the questioning that Keno's
slave-boy undergoes.
The traditional view, as we have it, is flawed by
imprecision, weak or nonexistent argument, and faulty
assumptions.
No attempt is made to clarify whether (1) and (2)
concern the object of knowledge or the act of knowing in some
occurrent sense, to clarify, that is, what exactly the paradox is
about and what a solution ought to provide. No attempt is made
to examine the text carefully and systematically in order to
defend the accuracy of the proposal. It is assumed rather than
argued that Plato means explicit knowledge or complete ignorance,
that the slave-boy interrogation is evidence for the doctrine of
recollection and not an illustration of it, that learning is
intended by Plato to be identical with and not similar to
recollection, and that the kind of knowledge at issue is
exclusively a priori. And there is tendency, not always made
explicit, to read the Phaedo account of recollection uncritically
back into the Meno. These are substantial difficulties and while
they do not of course refute the traditional conclusion, they do
weaken the case for it.
Recent treatments, notably those of Koravcsik, White, and
the brief one by Irwin, remedy many of these deficiencies. They
involve penetrating, subtle, and thorough argument and
scholarship. Right or wrong, they provide careful examination of
what the paradox is and hence what it would take to solve it and
scrupulous consideration of the text. These discussions are an
excellent foundation for further work.
Rather than simply survey these accounts, let me try to
identify their most significant common features and differences.
First, they agree that the paradox and hence the doctrine of
recollection are not about all kinds of inquiry and learning.
Rather they concern only that type of inquiry that is a
3

searching, and they are about that kind of learning that is the
result of an inquiry directed to a goal that is fixed in some way
in advance. Both Moravcsik and White emphasize this feature. We
might call this "purposive learning," but it is purposive
learning with the added condition that the learner must either
initiate the learning him or her self or at least have in some
way appropriated the task or goal of the learning for himself.
In seme sense, then, the paradox is about knowing what one is
looking for and yet not knowing it yet.
Secondly, Moravcsik, following tradition and Gregory Vlastos
in a paper on this subject, believes that the paradox and the
doctrine of recollection are solely concerned with a priori
knowledge and its acquisition via inquiry. This brings the heno
into line with the Phaedo and the later Platonic employment of
the doctrine of recollection; it makes the Meno the initial
Platonic statement on an issue of perennial philosophical
interest. White and Irwin, however, believe that the text of the
Meno is at best indecisive on this restriction and that while the
particular context for the paradox and what follows is
definitional inquiry, the paradox and doctrine as presented are
neutral with respect to their object. Part of their reason for
saying this is that neither the dialogue with the slave-boy nor
the notion of an aitias 1ogismos, introduced later as the
mechanism whereby true belief is converted into knowledge, seem
to require £ priori objects.
Ihirdly, Moravcsik takes recollection to be a metaphor for
learning via inquiry. For him, the solution to the paradox is
that learning works like remembering. In recall, we apprehend an
image, concept, etc. now, after having once apprehended at some
earlier time and since forgotten it. Some feature of this
activity must account for why it is recall, however, and not
simply two distinct apprehensions of the same thing. This
feature he calls a mental or physical factor in the rememberer
that is causally related to both the original apprehension and
the recall. When a new stimulus is experienced, it triggers a
recollection because of this "entitative factor" in the
rememberer. In learning, a question triggers an analogous factor
that issues in understanding and a response. Hence, for
Moravcsik the paradox is solved by grabbing both horns of the
dilemma:
the truths, i.e., sets of concepts cr beliefs, are in
us, and learning serves to bring them to consciousness. So, in a
sense, at the outset of inquiry, the learner does know the
answer, and in a sense he or she does not. by treating learning
as similar to recall, then, Moravcsik has given us a
sophisticated version of the traditional view in which learning a
priori truths is like remembering and begins with implicit but
not explicit knowledge of those truths.
Fourthly, for White and Irwin, the paradox is about
recognition, and because it is about recognition, it is also
about reference and identity of reference. How does one
recognize a successful outcome of an inquiry already framed? One
cannot recognize it without in some sense already having known
4

it. Self-initiated inquiry and recognition require knowledge of
a specification or description that directs the search from the
outset. The paradox is this: without knowledge of such a
specification, inquiry is impossible, but with such knowledge one
already knows what is being sought. White describes a case of
searching for a pair of gloves with a specification already in
hand and compares it to searching for a Form with a definition in
hand. The analogue shows how Plato might have thought that
having the specification looks like already having the goal. For
White, then, the paradox is very precisely about the epistemic
conditions necessary for getting a search or inquiry underway.
How, he asks, can one have a specification of the object of the
search without already knowing that object?
The traditional solution, and Moravcsik's as well, has
Socrates grab both horns of the dilemma. White disagrees. Plato
is wrong, he says, to think that with a specification of the
object sought we already have knowledge it. The specification
does not refer to the precise object sought but rather to the
sort of thing; it applies to the office and not the office
holder, to the position and not the candidate. In short, the
second horn of the dilemma is false, and to see this would solve
the paradox by dissolving it.
According to White, however, Plato chooses another route.
He solves the paradox by denying one horn of the dilemma -- that
we do know in a sense, for inquiry is recollection. In the case
of inquiry, specification counts as knowledge of the outcome, but
in the case of a directed recollection, specification does not
count as such knowledge.
Fifthly, Irwin agrees with White but only up to a point.
Inquiry is directed search, and the paradox does say that with
total ignorance or total, complete knowledge such a search is
impossible or unnecessary. Hut whereas White has Plato reject
one horn of the dilemma as false, Irwin has him nose between the
two. While ignorance makes inquiry impossible and knowledge
makes it unnecessary, true belief redeems inquiry and makes it
possible. What we need to initiate inquiry are enough true
beliefs about x to fix the reference cf the term "x" so that when
the inquiry is completed, we can see that we are still referring
to the same thing. What disarms the paradox is the explicit
distinction between knowledge and true belief made at S7e-S6b and
the implicit employment of that distinction earlier in the
dialogue with the slave-boy.
One important feature of Irwin's account is that Plato's
answer to the paradox does not come in the doctrine of
recollection. It comes first in the discussion with the slaveboy where the boy answers with true beliefs that are his own.
These beliefs involve specifications that are not knowledge. The
recollection thesis is not Plato's solution to the paradox. It
is one explanation -- and not necessarily the best one — of how
the boy can answer the way that he does, with these true beliefs,
but the real solution to the paradox comes in that answering,
5

with what Irwin calls "quasi-recollection," and with those
beliefs. In short, the paradox is solved by a fact and not by a
theory, and that fact is belief and the way in which it can be
employed to get inquiry started and carry it through to its
completion.
taca

TO THE MEtiO

A careful reading of the Meno, especially that passage
(8i)b8-8t>b4) in which Plato describes what had taken, place in the
interrogation of the slave-boy and draws inferences from that
description, gives us a view of the text that is indebted to
these interpretations but not wholly like any one of them.
Let us do two things. First, let us consider where
Moravcsik, White, ejt a_l. are correct and where the text shows
them to be wrong. Secondly, we should look at the passage just
mentioned to assess what it contributes to our understanding how
Plato in fact does solve the paradox.
iirst. White, Moravcsik, and Irwin are surely right to
restrict the paradox to purposive inquiry or directed search.
Socrates' reformulation of the dilemma and his own dialectical
interests encourage this restriction, as does the interrogation
of the slave-boy, which is simply a model of a full Socratic
elenchos. This, however, is not only the most important
restriction on the type of learning in question; it is also the
only restriction. Contra Vlastos and Moravcsik, the evidence
that the paradox and the doctrine are solely concerning with the
learning of a priori truths is simply not secure. White and
Irwin are right in this regard. Wot only is it doubtful that
Plato would have treated geometrical inquiries as a priori; the
formulation of the doctrine of recollection (81c) and the later
discussion about true beliefs and knowledge of the road to
Larissa show that Plato did not in the h e η o yet have in mind what
would later come to be treated as a distinction between empirical
and a_ priori truths. The fact that something of this order is
already present in Parmenides' poem does not by itself entail
that Plato, at this point in his career, had appropriated it, nor
does the further fact that by the time he had written the Phaedo
he had done so. To assume so is to disregard the possibility cf
serious intellectual development on Plato's part.
Secondly, the absence of the restriction to a priori
knowledge in the heno is matched by but perhaps not related to
the absence of the separated forms of Plato's middle dialogues,
and the separated forms are certainly missing from the heno. It
is not decisive of course that the nomenclature for the torms is
not present in the Keno. What is decisive are the facts that the
objects of belief and knowledge can be the same and that they are
spoken of as iji the soul. What are recalled as the result of
directed inquiry, contra V lastos, White, e_t a^., are truths,
i.e., true accounts that answer what-is-x questions, theorems,
and similar statements. We shall have more to say about these
6

truths, their role and nature. For the moment, it is sufficient
to notice that later Plato will indeed allude to the Meno account
of recollection -- in the Phaedo and Republic especially -- in
ways that locate Forms in it. But without decisive evidence in
favor of such an interpretation, we should be reluctant to take
Plato's word, as it were; he would surely not be the last
philosopher to read his more developed views into his own earlier
writings. It is in the Phaedo and not earlier that the doctrine
of learning as recollection, adopted previously, is adjusted to
suit the requirements of a newly developed metaphysical view and
specifically the existence of the Forms.
Thirdly, the burden Irwin places on belief is too great for
it to bear. In the heno, the difference between believing and
knowing is a difference in our activity of answering questions
correctly when called upon to do so and in general of affirming the
truth of a statement when such affirmation is called for. True
believing and knowledge are both directed to truths; they differ
because the one who merely believes what is true has not yet
worked out fully for himself why the truth is true and so will
not reliably affirm that truth when the situation calls upon him
to do so. The result of learning is not merely true believing,
although even at that stage the learner does have the truth in
mind. Real learning, as Plato explicitly says, is completed only
when the truth is so firmly fixed in the learner's mind that he
will always, reliably affirm it when the situation calls for its
affirmation. Furthermore, if belief solves the paradox, then why
does Socrates continue with his description cum argument after
85b8-c8? If Irwin is right, the doctrine of recollection is
artistic trapping and not serious philosophy, for, as he says,
the paradox is solved by the phenomenon of quasi-recollection;
the doctrine of recollection is merely one possible explanation
of how that quasi-recollection takes place. Irwin does not say,
in addition, that as a religious explanation it is fanciful and
not to be taken seriously, but he might very well have thought
it.
Fourthly, while Irwin is wrong about the role of belief in
Plato's solution to the paradox, he is more right than White is
about Plato's general strategy. Plato solves the dilemma not by
grabbing one horn and rejecting the other but rather by either
grasping both or nosing between them. This is a matter of
Socratic and Platonic style. White's interpretation gives us a
different Plato and one whose solution is rather inexplicable and
arbitrary. For White cannot really explain why Plato would have
thought that having a prior specification is not knowledge in the
case of recollection whereas it _is knowledge in the case of
inquiry. We are not really shown why Plato should have taken
this to be a solution at all. White's analysis depends on the
supposition thet Plato would have thought that having a
specification in the case of directed recollection would not
count as knowledge. But the crucial kind of recollection, for
Plato, is not directed or purposive. Even if to learn is to
recall, it is hardly the case that trying to learn is trying to
recall.
7

Finally, Koravcsik is mistaken to think that learning is
only like recollection. At 65c-d Plato moves from his account
that the be liéis were in the boy to the conclusion that knowledge
is in him -- which must mean that the truths, i.e., the objects
of believing and knowing are in him -- and then to the further
conclusion that this is reco1 lection. It is, he says, recovering
again knowledge that is already in one's soul. Koravcsik may be
right that analyses of recall and learning reveal that they can
be interpreta ted as having an analogous structure. but in the
Meno Plato gives no indication that he has that analogous
structure in mind. In fact, what he does indicate is that
directed inquiry is possible not because it is like recall but
because it is in fact a case of reca 11 (b¿¡c9-d8). If you have
something in your ken, was it possible for you to look for it
before you had it without already having it? Only, Plato says,
if having it now is having it once again or calling it to mind
once again and if the search began with that something already in
your mind but not yet in your ken.
All of these recent interpretations of the doctrine of
recollection and how it is intended to solve the paradox of
inquiry rest on the same foundation. They all agree that the
doctrine must be about the epistemological conditions necessary
for inquiry and directed learning. This is most vividly present
in White and Irwin where the issue is taken to be one of
reference and identity of reference and hence how the learner's
referential capacities in terms of certain specifications at the
outset of inquiry are related to his referential successes at the
end. Eut if, in a sense, Plato is interested in reference, in
the learner's thinking of something, he is interested not in its
epistemological conditions but rather in its metaphysical ones.
He is concerned, that is, about the object of reference and not
how the referring gets done. For this mental referring, for
Plato, is like any kind of grasping; without an object, it is
just a matter of waving the hand. But if at the outset of
inquiry, one has the object in one's grasp, then it is
unnecessary and perhaps even impossible to look for it. And if
not, then where does it come from. In Socrates' reformulation of
the paradox, he says of the inquirer that if "he does not know,
[then] he does not even know what he is to look for." This means
that if he does have what is to be grasped, then how is he to
grasp it -- for all this mental grasping goes on in the soul.
One of the keys that unlocks the paradox of inquiry and the
doctrine of recollection is the realization that for Plato the
objects of true believing and knowing are truths. These truths
he detaches from the world and places in the soul, and believing
and knowing are grasping truths in one's soul.
Inquiry or
learning is a matter of searching for these truths, and the paradox
of inquiry, to Plato, is a puzzle about how directed searching
can succeed. The doctrine of recollection is the doctrine that
having a truth does not imply grasping or knowing it but that
knowing or grasping it implies and indeed requires having it.
Beliefs do not solve the paradox, for true ones are already a
8

matter of grasping, though tentatively, truths whereas false ones
are no better than ignorance. Nor do sufficiently accurate
specifications do the job, for the issue is not what directions
one takes to getting the grasping or pointing started but rather
what is there to be grasped or pointed at. The only thing that
will solve the paradox is to show that the truths that are the
objects of true believing and knowing are ^n the soul always,
which is just what Plato shows at 85d-86b. The best Platonic
image of how the doctrine of recollection is intended to solve
the paradox of inquiry comes from Plate himself -- the image of
birds in the aviary of the soul and the distinction between
having and holding. But the kinship between the Meno and the
Theaetetus on this as on other issues has not gone unnoticed by
other commentators, nor is it surprising. tor the Theaetetus is
about what knowledge is, which on the Meno's own principles is a
question prior to the question how it is got. And the aviary is
proposed as an answer to the problem of how false belief is
possible, an answer offered perhaps because it had already served
with some satisfaction to explain how true belief and inquiry
are possible.
The paradox of inquiry is solved by recognizing that the
truths apprehended and affirmed at the culmination of inquiry are
always in the soul, always available as objects of our mental
grasp.But this boldly metaphysical solution may seem gratuitous.
Why require Plato to have introduced an otherwise unattested
metaphysical entity when the Forms are at hand? Indeed, what is
this thing that he calls "the truth of things (.that] is always in
the soul?" tahat is the structure of these truths? What is their
nature?
A short answer to these queries would be that Plato simply
does not explore or illuminate the ontological status of these
truths or their structure. They are introduced to solve a
serious epistemological puzzle and are derived by inference from
the doctrine of inquiry and learning as recollection, a doctrine
appropriated from Orphic lore and tooled to Plato's purposes.
But this is the short answer; more can be said, although it
is conjectural and speculative. As Plato begins to explore
seriously epistemological matters concerning believing, knowing,
their relations and objects, equipped as he is with a Socratic
view of the soul as the seat of personality, character, and
intellect, he comes to see that the objects of knowing and
believing, permanent and stable truths, cannot be in the world.
Eventually he will dictate the terms of these objects' status;
they will be ungenerated, imperishable, immutable, pure, and so
on, all attributes appropriate to the certainty of knowledge. In
the Meno, however, he has not yet reached that momentous
metaphysical discovery. Here Plato is groping for a solution to
a precise puzzle and, if only temporarily, locates truth not in a
Platonic heaven but rather in the soul, within the soul's easy
reach. Later, in the Theaetetus and Sophist, he will say that a
logos is the external expression of a doxa, and in the Parmenides
he will propose and then dispose of the suggestion that Forms are
9

thoughts (noemata) in the soul. Perhaps, then, the Meno's truths
are internal sentences or thoughts -- examples surely include
true theorems of geometry and true answers to what-is-x questions
-- although Plato gives no helpful clues or advice concerning
their structure. All of this notwithstanding, the truths in the
soul, the objects of true believing and knowing in the Meno, are
soon abandoned in favor of the separated forms, only to resurface
in different guises throughout the course of Western philosophy.
In the passage immediately following the interrogation of
Meno's slave-boy (85b8-86b4), Plato indicates clearly that this
is how he understands what he has written. If we look first at
&5b8-c8, we see that in this passage Plato has incorporated an
important transition, from a seemingly harmless description of
the slave-boy's behavior -- the beliefs are "his own" — to a
potentially serious epistemological and possibly metaphysical
claim -- they are "in him" (85c4)· And what "in him" must mean
at this stage of the dialogue is "not in another," e.g.,not in
Socrates. The boy's beliefs, that is, are believings about
things in him and not about things in another. Later Plato
writes that among the beliefs in the boy are true ones (85c6-7),
and that if this is so (86a6-7), then what is in him is hë
a letheia ton onton. "In him" is explicitly said to mean "in the
soul" [8bb1-257 and so what Meno agrees to ultimately is that the
objects of the boy's believing are truths in his soul.
At 85c9-d8 Plato has Socrates use this conclusion, that the
objects of believing are in the soul, to generate the conclusion
that the boy's "recovering knowledge that is in him [is]
recollecting" (85d?). Meno casually accepts the proposal that
beliefs, newly aroused like a dream, can be converted into
knowledge, for he finds no difficulty in agreeing that once a
truth is in the mind, then the transition from believing it to
knowing it is not insurmountable. Hence, the boy can be said to
"recover the knowledge out of himself" (85d3-4)» where
"knowledge" clearly refers to the object of the knowing, the
truth about the diagonal on the given square. heno is so casual
about accepting the word "recover" that its meaning must be the
most obvious. Prior to the boy's being asked a question, a given
truth is in his soul but unattended to. When the question is
asked, the boy responds by assenting to the truth, first as a
belief, later as knowledge. And he does so by grasping again
what he already had but only in an unapprehended fashion, and
such a grasping again is an act of recovery. This is Socrates'
line of reasonings from belief to knowledge to recovery to
recollection, with his attention always on the truths that are
the objects of all four.
The final section of this sequel to the slave-boy discussion
(65d9-86b5) is exceedingly difficult. In his final speech
Socrates recites the conclusions associated with the doctrine of
recollection— that the soul is immortal, that inquiry is
recollection, and that one ought to be bold and confident in
undertaking inquiry into what one does not presently know (8bb110

4). But while these are the results of this entire stretch of
the dialogue, it is far from clear how they are got.
There is a very precise argument developed in this passage.
This is the argument:
(1) Recollection is the recovery of truths which one once
knew but which one does not currently apprehend.
(2) These truths either (a) were grasped or seized at a
particular time or (b) were always in one *s possession.
(C) The truth of things is always in our soul.
The conclusion is given in the protasis of a conditional at bbbl2. In interpreting this argument there are two possibilities,
that (C) is the same as (b) or that (c) follows whether (a) or
(b) is true. A careful reading of the intermediate dialogue
shows, I think, that the latter alternative, though more
difficult to see, is indeed the correct one.
If we were to assume that (C) is the same as (2b), then the
most natural way to arrive at (C) from (1) and (2) would be to
show that (2a) is false.
Unfortunately, at 85d12-86a10 Socrates
does net do this.
The argument of this intervening stretch of
dialogue is this:
(j>)
If one always had the truths (=2b), then one would also
always be a knower.
(4) If one grasped the truths at a particular time (=2a),
that time was when one was not a human being.
(i>) Some true beliefs are in the boy during the time when
he is a human being and during the time he is not a
human being.
(6) tor all time, the soul is or is not a human being.
(7) Therefore, the boy's soul has truths for all time
(=2b ).
The upshot of this line of reasoning, then, is that the boy
recalls truths which he once learned only if he always has them.
The truths are iri his soul for all time, always.
It seems to be
Socrates' strategy to show that if learning is recollection, then
the recollected truths are always in the soul.
There is no
alternative.
This argument helps us to see what Plato has in mind as the
solution to the paradox of inquiry.
Consider again step (3):
what does it mean to say that "he would also be a knower?" we
have argued that Irwin is wrong about the solution to the
paradox. hhile it may be plausible to think that the solution
comes at 65cb-7 with so-called quasi-recollection, this is not
Plato's solution.
but if belief does not make inquiry possible,
what does? Öbd12 may be the core of the answer to that question.
Inquiry is possible only if the boy can recall truths already
within him. But he can do this only if he always possessed those
truths. The argument we are currently examining shows this to be
the only condition for such recollection; one cannot recall
something that is not in one's own mind but rather in another's,
from the fact that the boy has always possessed these truths, we
can infer that in a sense "he is also always a knower." But this
disarms the paradox; inquiry is not unnecessary even when one
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knows. Indeed, such knowledge is a necessary condition for the
possibility of such inquiry, even though the boy, at the same
time, is not a knower in the sense that he knows the truths and
knows that he knows them. There is here, as it were, no act of
knowing at all, only once-having-known and possession. This, I
think, is the only kind of knowing that the word
(85d12) can refer to.
'
In this examination of 8i>b8-86t4 we have shown that Plato
first describes the slave-boy's behavior in such a way that it
can be said to be a case of recollection and then argues that
what is recalled, the truths first believed and eventually known,
are always in the soul to be recalled. Plato is concerned about
getting inquiry started only in so far as he believes that
without the truths present in the inquirer's soul it can neither
start nor succeed. It is in this sense that his interest in
inquiry is metaphysical and net epistemological; Plato's problem
about reference is the referrent and not the referring.
Directed
inquiry is possible only in so far as that referrent is always in
the soul and coming to know it is a matter of recollection.
In some ways the solution 1 have developed rennovates the
traditional view of how Plato solves the eristic puzzle, but it
does so, 1 hope, with greater attention to the details of the
text and the course of Plato's reasoning that are carefully
examined by more recent commentators. but it has an advantage
over the latter whose interpretations require of Plato a more
nuanced interest in language and epistemology than the Meno by
itself warrants. My interpretation does not require Plato to
have distinguished tetween empirical and a priori truths, nor
does it thrust the burden of the solution to belief rather than
knowledge.
It does not treat the doctrine of recollection as an
unnecessary appendage nor as a metaphor but instead sees it as
the precise vehicle for identifying these truths whose ongoing
presence in the soul ultimately solves the paradox. And finally
it takes seriously the discussion following the slave-boy
dialogue, at &5b8-86b4, in which important conclusions are drawn
from that dialogue and from the doctrine of learning as
recollection. lo my mind, the emergence of Platonic genius is in
large part the emergence of Plato's metaphysical thinking. On
the interpretation that I have offered the Meno is a crucial
stage in this process, a fact which will, among other things, I
hope, recommend it.
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